We prove the existence of binary codes of positive rate that can correct an arbitrary pattern of p fraction of deletions, for any p < 1, when the bit positions to delete are picked obliviously of the codeword. Formally, we prove that for every p < 1, there exists R > 0 and a code family with a randomized encoder Enc : {0, 1}
Introduction
Tremendous progress has been made over the decades, including in recent years, on the problem of designing error-correcting codes that can recover from bit (or symbol) errors and erasures, for both probabilistic and adversarial noise models. The problem of correcting closely related insertion and deletion errors has also been studied since the work of Levenshtein in the 60s [22] , but has has resisted such progress so far. The difficulty is that in the presence of deletions, the sender and receiver lose valuable synchronization information on the location of various symbols, and this renders many of the standard techniques for constructing either inapplicable or at least very tricky and messy to apply. To quote from Mitzenmacher's survey [25] : "[C]hannels with synchronization errors, including both insertions and deletions as well as more general timing errors, are simply not adequately understood by current theory. Given the near-complete knowledge we have [for] channels with erasures and errors . . . our lack of understanding about channels with synchronization errors is truly remarkable."
In particular, for both the random and adversarial noise models, there are big gaps in our knowledge of the power and limitations of codes against insertions and deletions. For concreteness, let us focus our discussion on the model when there are only deletions, which is already complicated enough, and captures most of the chief difficulties associated with coding against synchronization errors. Note that over large alphabets, in particular those which can grow with the code length, one can add the coordinate position as a header to the codeword symbol, and reduce the deletion model to the simpler erasure model, at the expense of a negligible decrease in rate (due to the addition of the header). However, for fixed alphabets, deletions seem much harder to cope with than erasures. We focus on the most interesting case of binary codes in this work.
In order to set the context and motivation for this work, let us review the situation for adversarial and random deletions in turn, before turning to the contributions of this paper. In each setting we want a code C ⊆ {0, 1} n consisting of binary codewords of length n that has good rate (where rate R means |C| = 2 Rn , and we would like R to be as large as possible, and certainly bounded away from 0 as n grows). We also have a deletion fraction p ∈ (0, 1), roughly denoting, as a fraction of n, the number of bits the adversary can delete. In adversarial deletions, the adversary is allowed to delete up to pn bits with full knowledge of a codeword and codebook. A code C is decodable against pn adversarial deletions iff, for any two distinct codewords c and c ′ in C, it is impossible to apply pn (possibly different) deletions to c and c ′ and obtain the same result. This is easily seen to be equivalent to the condition that the longest common subsequence between any two codewords of C has less than (1 − p)n bits. By a lemma originally due to Levenshtein [22] , this condition also ensures that C is capable of correcting any combination of adversarial insertions and deletions totaling pn in number.
When p ≥ 1/2, the adversary can delete n/2 bits that includes either all the 0's or all the 1's in the codeword, resulting in just two possible received sequences. Therefore, it is impossible to correct an adversarial deletion fraction of 1/2 with rate bounded away from 0. Rather remarkably, we do not know if this trivial limit can be approached: are there codes C ⊆ {0, 1} n of size 2 Ω ǫ (n) decodable against (1/2 − ǫ)n deletions for any ǫ > 0? Or is there some p * bounded away from 1/2 such that any code C ⊆ {0, 1} n that is decodable against p * n deletions must have size at most 2 o(n) ? This was explicitly raised as a key open problem in [23] . Upper bounds on the asymptotic rate function in terms of the deletion fraction were obtained in [19] , improving in some respects Levenshtein's bounds [23] . New upper bounds on code size for a fixed number of deletions that improve over [22] were obtained in [5] .
Turning to constructions of deletion codes, Kash et al. [17] proved that randomly chosen codes of small enough rate R > 0 can correctly decode against pn adversarial deletions when p ≤ 0.17. Even nonconstructively, this remained the best achievability result (in terms of correctable deletion fraction) until recently. Bukh, Guruswami, and Håstad [1] improved this and showed that there are binary codes of rate bounded away from 0 decodable against pn adversarial deletions for any p < √ 2 − 1; furthermore, they also gave an efficient construction of such codes along with an efficient deletion correcting algorithm. Closing the gap between √ 2 − 1 and 1 2 for the maximum fraction of correctable deletions remains a tantalizing open problem.
Turning to randomly caused deletions, the basic noise model is the binary deletion channel where each bit is deleted independently with probability p. Diggavi and Grossglauser [8] establish that the capacity of the deletion channel for p ≤ 1 2 is at least 1 − h(p). Kalai et al. [15] proved this lower bound is tight as p → 0, and Kanoria and Montanari [16] determined a series expansion that can be used to determine the capacity exactly. The capacity of the binary deletion channel is certainly at most that of the simpler binary erasure channel with erasure probability, namely 1 − p. Rahmati and Duman [26] prove that the capacity is at most 0.4143(1 − p) for p ≥ 0.65. For large deletion probabilities, this is, to our knowledge, the best known upper bound. Drinea and Mitzenmacher [9, 10] proved that the capacity of random deletion codes is at least (1 − p)/9, which is within a constant factor of the upper bound. However, to the best of our knowledge, explicit efficiently decodable code constructions were not available for the binary deletion channel for arbitrary p < 1; quoting from the first page of Mitzenmacher's survey [25] : "Currently, we have no closed-form expression for the capacity, nor do we have an efficient algorithmic means to numerically compute this capacity." Furthermore, the literature after Mitzenmacher's 2009 survey seems to primarily address the capacity of the random deletion channel [18, 11, 6] . One work that considers efficient recovery against random deletions is by Yazdi and Dolecek [28] . In their setting, two parties Alice and Bob are connected by a two-way communication channel. Alice has a string X, Bob has string Y obtained by passing X through a binary deletion channel with deletion probability p ≪ 1, and Bob must recover X. They produce a polynomial-time synchronization scheme that trasmits a total of O(pn log(1/p)) bits and allows Bob to recover X with probability exponentially approaching 1.
Our contributions
With the above context, we now turn to our results in this work. Our main result concerns a natural model that bridges between the adversarial and random deletion models, namely oblivious deletions. Here we assume that an arbitrary subset of pn locations of the codeword can be deleted, but these positions must be picked without knowledge of the codeword. The oblivious model is well-motivated in settings where the noise may be mercurial and caused by hard to model physical phenomena, but not by an adversary.
If the code is deterministic, tackling oblivious deletions is equivalent to recovering from worst-case deletions. We allow the encoder to be randomized, and require that for every message m and every deletion pattern τ, most encodings of m can be decoded from the deletion pattern τ. The randomness used at the encoding is private to the encoder and is not needed at the decoder, which we require to be deterministic. Note that the oblivious model generalizes random deletions, as deleting each bit independently with probability p is oblivious to the actual codeword, and with high probability one has ≈ pn deletions. Of course, any code which is decodable against pn adversarial deletions is decodable also against pn oblvious deletions, even without any randomization in the encoding. Perhaps surprisingly, we prove that in the oblivious model, the limit of p ≤ 1/2 does not apply, and in fact one can correct a deletion fraction p approaching 1. This generalizes the result that one can correct a fraction p → 1 of random deletions.
where the probability is over the randomness of the encoder (which is private to the encoder and not known to the decoder). 1 The above result is implied by deterministic codes C decodable from arbitrary pn deletions under average-error criterion; i.e., there is a decoding function Dec : {0, 1} (1−p)n → C such that for every deletion pattern τ with pn deletions, for most codewords c ∈ C, Dec(τ(c)) = c. We stress that the above is an existential result, and the codes guaranteed by the above theorem are not explicitly specified. The decoding algorithm amounts to looking for a codeword which contains the received bit string as a subsequence, and outputting it if there is a unique such codeword.
We also consider the problem of constructing explicit codes with efficient decoding for the binary deletion channel. Here our result is the following. Our rate is worse than the (1 − p)/9 achieved nonconstructively, but has asymptotically the same dependence on p for p → 1. Our construction concatenates an outer Reed Solomon code concatenated with a good inner binary code. To construct the inner code, we first choose a binary code correcting a small fraction of adversarial deletions. By concentration bounds, duplicating bits of a codeword in a disciplined manner is effective against the random deletion channel, so we duplicate every bit of the binary code Θ(1/(1 − p)) times. We further ensure our initial adversarial code has only runs of length 1 and 2 to maximize the effectiveness of duplication.
One might wonder whether it would be possible to use Drinea and Mitzenmacher's existential result [9, 10] of a (1 − p)/9 capacity lower bound as a black box to achieve a better rate efficiently. We discuss this approach in §5.2 and elaborate on several factors that make the approach nontrivial.
Related work on oblivious and other noise models
The model of oblivious errors (such as bit flips) has has been studied in the information-theory literature as a particular case of arbitrarily varying channels with state constraints [21] (see the related work section of [13] for more background on this connection). In particular, for the case of bit flips, the capacity against the model of pn oblivious bit flips (for p ≤ 1/2) equals 1 − h(p), matching the Shannon capacity of the binary symmetric channel that flips each bit independently with probability p. (This special case was re-proved in [20] by a different simpler random coding argument compared to the original works [3, 4] .) Similarly, the capacity against the model of pn oblivious erasures is 1 − p, matching the Shannon capacity of the binary erasure channel. Explicit codes of rate approaching 1 − h(p) to correct pn oblivious bit flips (in the sense of Theorem 1.1, with randomized encoding) were given in [13] . This work also considered computationally bounded noise models, such as channels with bounded memory or with small circuits, and gave optimal rate codes for list decoding against those models. These models are more general than oblivious errors, but still not as pessimistic as adversarial noise.
Notice that in the case of both erasures and errors, the capacity in the oblivious and random models were the same. It is not clear if this is the case for deletions. The rate of the codes we guarantee in Theorem 1.1 for p → 1 are much worse than the Ω(1 − p) lower bound known for random deletions.
One other interesting model that sits between oblivious and adversarial noise is the online model. Here the channel chooses whether to erase/flip/delete bit i of the codeword based on bits 1, . . . , i, without knowledge of the future bits of the codeword, and is limited to corrupting at most pn bits total. In a beautiful work, Chen, Jaggi, and Langberg [2] determined the exact capacities of the online erasure channel and the online bit-flip channel. A recent work studies a seemingly slight (but in fact fundamental) restriction of the online model where the channel's decision regarding the i'th bit depends only on the first (i − 1) bits and is independent of the current bit [7] . They proved that in the setting of erasures, the capacity in this restricted online model increases to match the capacity 1 − p of the binary erasure channel, as opposed to 1 − 2p in the true online model.
Note that if a code C corrects pn adversarial deletions, it also corrects pn online deletions. Furthermore, for online deletions the adversary can choose to delete every 1 or every 0 it sees, which means online deletions cannot be decoded for noise rate p ≥ 1 2 . Thus for online deletions the zero rate threshold is between √ 2 − 1 and 1 2 . It is an interesting challenge to ascertain if one can take advantage of the online restriction, and push some of the ideas in [1] and this work, to enable decoding a fraction of online deletions approaching To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first work to address oblivious deletions, and online deletions have not been studied in the literature. We feel that given the large gaps in our understanding of coding against adversarial deletions, and the potential of taking advantage of less stringent models of deletion exhibited in this work, further study of these models seems timely and important.
Structure of this paper
In §2 we outline our oblivious deletion construction and sketch the proof of why it is correct. In §3 we introduce definitions and notation for the remainder of the paper. In §4 we state and prove our construction on codes in the oblivious model with p deletion fraction where p ∈ (0, 1). In §5 we state and prove our construction of efficiently decodable codes in the random deletion setting.
Outline of Oblivious Deletion Proof
Our first, naive attempt at this problem is to choose a random subset of 2 RN codewords in {0, 1} N . This technique, however, does not work in the same way it does for oblivious bit-flips. See Appendix B for a discussion on the difficulties of this approach.
Instead of proving Theorem 1.1 directly, we prove a related theorem for decoding in the average case. First, a definition. Definition 2.1. We say a (nonstochastic) binary code C with rate R and length N decodes pN deletions in the average case if for any deletion pattern τ deleting pN bits, we have |{x ∈ C : ∃y ∈ C s. t. x y and τ(x) ≤ y}| ≤ o N (|C|).
(1) It is standard to show that oblivious and average-case decoding are equivalent. In particular Theorem 2.2 implies Theorem 1.1. For completeness we provide a proof of this implication and state similar results relating adversarial, oblivious, average-case, and random error models in Appendix A. In fact the capacity for decoding in the average case is the same as the capacity for the oblivious channel. Roughly, if we have a length N code C with rate R that decodes against pN deletions in the average case, then we can group the codewords into sets of size 2 0.01Rn . Then we associate every message with a set of codewords and encode the message by randomly choosing a codeword from its set. Our decoding function simply takes a received word s and looks for a codeword c such that s ⊑ c, i.e. c is a superstring of s. If there is exactly one such c, output the associated codeword, otherwise output ⊥. Using the fact that C decodes pN deletions in the average case, we can show that for all deletion patterns τ, only a few codewords do not decode correctly via unique decoding in our new stochastic code.
We now outline our construction for Theorem 2.2. Our construction for the average deletion code uses the "clean construction" construction from [1] with appropriately selected parameters. The idea is to choose a concatenated code such that the inner code widely varies in the number of runs between codewords. Specifically, we choose sufficiently large constants R and K and set our inner code to have length L = 2R K . For i = 1, 2, . . . , K, set our inner codewords to be
where 0 k and 1 k denote strings of k 0s and 1s, respectively. In this way, the number of runs between any two codewords differs by a factor of at least R. Our outer code is a subset of [K] n , so that the total code length is N = nL, and we concatenate the code via a function ψ : [K] * → {0, 1} * that replaces a symbol i ∈ [K] with the string g i ∈ {0, 1} L . The outer code is chosen via a random process, detailed in the following paragraphs; the process throws out a small subset of "bad" elements of [K] n and chooses a constant rate code by including each remaining element independently with some small fixed probability. Our decoding function is unique decoding. That is, given a received word s, we find a codeword c such that s ⊑ c. 2 If such a codeword is unique, our decoder returns that output. Otherwise, the decoder returns ⊥.
The following example illustrates why the varying run length is powerful even for correct more than 0.5N deletions: Suppose n = 100, p = 0.9, R ≫ 20, our received word is s = g 10 1 (that is, 10 copies of g 1 concatenated together) and our code contains the codeword c = g 100 2 .
Then s is a subsequence of c if and only if we can identify each of the 10 g 1 s with non-overlapping bits of c. However, since g 1 contains over 20 times as many runs as g 2 , each g 1 must be identified with a subsequence of c spanning at least 20 inner codewords, i.e. copies of g 2 . This means the subsequence s roughly must span at least 200 inner codewords, but c only has 100 inner codewords, contradiction. While this imbalanced run-count behavior is a key to our argument, it is worth noting that the behavior is asymmetric. In particular, while it takes R copies of g 2 to produce g 1 as a subsequence, we only need two copies of g 1 to produce g 2 as a subsequence.
To analyze this code, we leverage the run-count beavhior of the inner codewords. This contrasts with the adversarial setting, where the run-count property of the same code is featured less centrally in the proof of correctness [1] . We show that for any deletion pattern τ with up to pN deletions, two random codewords X and Y are "confusable" with exponentially small probability in N. To be precise, we have for all τ,
The idea for this proof can be illustrated in the case that τ deletes only entire inner codewords. If τ deletes pn of the n inner codewords and does not touch the remaining codewords, then τ(ψ(X)) has the same distribution over length (1 − p)N binary strings as ψ(X ′ ) where X ′ ∼ U( [K] (1−p)n ). Thus we would like to show Pr
Consider trying to find ψ(X ′ ) as a subtring of ψ(Y) where is approximately distributed as Geometric(k/K). Thus, the number of inner codewords of Y spanned by a single inner codeword
If we choose K so that Θ(log K) > 2 1−p then the expected number of inner codewords of Y spanned by X ′ is more than Θ(log K) · (1 − p)n > 2n, so concentration bounds tell us that the probability that ψ(X ′ ) ⊑ ψ(Y) is exponentially small in n.
Note that there is a slight caveat to the above argument because the numbers of inner codewords in ψ(Y) spanned by ψ(X ′ i ) are not independent across all i. For example, if ψ(Y) begins with g 2 g 1 and ψ(X ′ ) begins with g 1 g 1 , then the second inner codeword of ψ(Y) has a few "leftover bits" that easily match with ψ(X ′ )'s second inner codeword. However, we can adjust for this independence by relaxing our analysis by a constant factor.
The above addresses the case when the deletion pattern, for each inner codeword, either deletes the codeword entirely or does not modify it at all. We now show how to extend this to general deletion patterns, starting with the case of p < deletions to an inner codeword with r runs cannot make the number of runs less than (0.5 − p)r, as it can delete at most (0.5 + p)/2 fraction of the runs, and deleting each run reduces the number of runs by at most two. If we choose R ≫ 1/(0.5 − p) 2 , then we can guarantee that even if we have a generic deletion pattern, we have a constant fraction (0.5 − p) of positions for which the run-count properties of all inner codewords in those positions are preserved up to a factor of √ R. Thus, as the number of runs between any two inner codewords differs by a factor of at least R, even after these corruptions the ratio between the number of runs of two "preserved" inner codewords is still at least √ R. Using the same argument as above and now requiring Θ(log K) > 2 0.5−p , we can conclude that even for general deletion patterns that the probability that two random candidate codewords are confused is exponentially small.
As a technical note, working with deletion patterns directly is messy as they encode a large amount of information, much of which we do not need in our analysis. Furthermore, the caveat mentioned in the clean deletion pattern case regarding the independence of number inner codewords spanned by some ψ(X ′ i ) becomes more severe for general deletion patterns. This happens because in general deletion patterns, especially later for p > 1 2 , the inner codewords of ψ(X) that have preserved their run-count property might nonetheless be shorter, so many (in particular, Θ(1/(1 − p))) inner codewords could match to single inner codewords of ψ(Y). To alleviate this complexity in the analysis, we introduce a technical notion called a matching intended to approximate the subsequence relation. This notion allows us to capture only the runcount behavior of the deletion patterns with respect to the inner codewords while also accounting for the lack-of-independence caveat. For a deletion pattern τ, let σ be the associated deletion pattern such that σ(X) to removes all outer codeword symbols except the ones in whose position τ preserves the run-count property of all the inner codewords (these exist because we are still in the case p < 1/2). In our proof, we argue that if τ(ψ(X)) is a subsequence of ψ(Y), then σ(X) has a matching in Y, and that the probability that σ(X) has a matching in Y for two codewords X and Y is exponentially small.
To extend the argument for generic deletion patterns from p < 1/2 to p < 1, we must use a "local list decoding" idea. Note that when the number of deletion patterns exceeds 1/2, for every codeword there exists deletion patterns that destroy all or almost all of the information in the codeword, e.g. the deletion pattern that deletes all the 1s (or 0s) of the codeword. For this reason, codes cannot correct against more than 1/2 fraction of adversarial deletions. However, one can show that this does not happen too frequently allowing us to correct oblivious and average case deletions. In contrast to the p < 1/2 case where we found a small, constant fraction of inner codeword positions in which the deletion pattern of the inner codeword preserved the run-count property for all inner codewords, we can now find a small, constant fraction of inner codeword positions in which the deletion pattern of the inner codeword preserves the run-count property for all but a few inner codewords. For example, even if an inner code deletion pattern deletes every other bit and thus deletes all the information of g 1 , the number of runs of g 2 , g 3 , . . . , g K are still preserved. We call this idea "local list decoding" because while we cannot decode our constant fraction of inner codewords uniquely, we can still pin down the inner codewords to a few possibilities. By extending our definition of matching to account for a few inner codewords potentially losing their run-count behavior, we can prove, just as for
has a matching in Y, and σ(X) having a matching in Y happens with small probability. At this point of the proof, we have combinatorially established everything we need to prove that our code is decodable in the average case (and thus against oblivious deletions). That is, we have shown that a random candidate codeword in ψ([K] n ) has an exponentially small probability of being confused with another random candidate codeword. Given that codewords have an exponentially small probability of being confusable with each other, it is natural to consider choosing a code by randomly selecting a subset of [K] n . Using this construction, we might try using concentration bounds to show that, for any deletion pattern τ, the probability that we have more than ǫ|C| codewords (for ǫ = o(N)) that are confusable with some other codeword is at most 2 −ω(N) , and we can union bound over the at-most-2 N choices of τ. This however does not work directly as the decodability for a given deletion pattern τ depends on the decodability of other deletion patterns. For example, if p > 1 2 and we happen to choose c = ψ(11 . . . 1) = 0101 . . . 01 as a codeword, then for any deletion pattern τ with pN deletions, c ′ ⊑ c for all candidate codewords c ′ . From this example alone, the probability of many codewords confusable with c is at least K −n and there are many more examples of such easily disguised candidate codewords. Fortunately, we can prove that the number of easily disguised candidate codewords is small. In particular, we show that the majority of elements of ψ([K] n ) are not easily disguised in all deletion patterns τ. This intuitively makes sense because, as we have shown, in any deletion pattern τ, on average, words are disguised as an exponentially small fraction of codewords, and because the easily disguised words tend to be easily disguised in every deletion pattern τ. For example, ψ(11 . . . 1 K ) = 0101 . . . 01 is easily disguised for any deletion pattern τ.
After throwing out the easily disguised candidate codewords, we randomly choose a constant rate code from the remaining candidate codewords. Careful bookkeeping confirms that with positive probability we obtain a code that decodes pN-deletions in the average case. The bookkeeping is nontrivial, because just as there are a handful of words like ψ(11 . . . 1) that are easily disguised as other codewords with deletions, there are also a handful of easily confused words like ψ(KK . . . K) that can be confused with many other words when deletions are applied to it. Furthermore, unlike easily disguised codewords, these easily confused words vary over the different deletion patterns, so we cannot simply throw them out. However, like for easily disguised codewords, we show the number of easily confused words is an exponentially small fraction of the codebook size in expectation, so such words do not contribute significantly to the number of incorrectly decoded codewords. Note the subtle difference between easily disguised and easily confused words: a single easily disguised word like ψ(11 . . . 1) causes many candidate codewords to fail to decode under our unique decoding, but any easily confused codeword adds at most one failed decoding.
We model managing easily disguised and easily confusable codewords via a directed graph, where, roughly, for each deletion pattern, we consider a graph on [K] n where − − → Y X is an edge if and only if τ(ψ(X)) ⊑ ψ(Y). In our proof, we replace the subsequence relation with the matching relation (see §4.4). In this graph language, the easily disguised codewords correspond to vertices with high outdegree, and the easily confusable codewords correspond to vertices with high indegree. Our construction illustrates the subtle nature of the oblivious deletion channel and average case errors. These settings share much of the behavior of the adversarial deletion channel such as the fact that for p > 1 2 , every codeword has a deletion pattern destroying all of its information. Consequently, our approach tackles the oblivious and average case errors using a combinatorial argument just as the best adversarial deletion results do [1] . Yet, the relaxed decoding requirement allows us to exploit it to correct a fraction of deletions approaching 1.
Preliminaries
General Notation. For a boolean statement P, let 1[P] be 1 if P is true and 0 otherwise.
Throughout the paper, log x refers to the base-2 logarithm. We use interval notation [a, b] = {a, a+1, . . . , b} to denote intervals of integers, and we use
For a set S and an integer a, let S a denote the family subsets of S of size a. Let U(S ) denote the uniform distribution on S .
Words. A word is a sequence of symbols from some alphabet. We denote string concatenation of two words w and w ′ with ww ′ . We denote w k = ww · · · w where there are k concatenated copies of w. We also denote a concatenation of a sequence of words as
We denote words from binary alphabets with lowercase letters c, s, w and words from non-binary alphabets with capital letters X, Y, Z.
A subsequence of a word w is a word obtained by removing some (possibly none) of the symbols in w.
A subword or interval of a word w is a contiguous subsequence of characters from w. We identify intervals of words with intervals of integers corresponding to the indices of the subsequence. For example, the interval {1, 2, . . . , |w|} = [1, |w|] is identified with the entire word w.
Let w ′ ⊑ w denote "w ′ is a subsequence of w". Define a run of a word w to be a maximal single-symbol subword. That is, a subword w ′ in w consisting of a single symbol such that any longer subword containing w ′ has at least two different symbols. Note the runs of a word partition the word. For example, 110001 has 3 runs: one run of 0s and two runs of 1s.
Deletion Patterns. A deletion pattern is a function τ that removes a fixed subset of symbols from words of a fixed length. Let D(n, m) denote the set of deletion patterns τ that operate on length n words and apply exactly m deletions. For example τ :
. We identify each deletion pattern τ ∈ D(n, m) with a size m subset of [n] corresponding to the deleted bits. We often use sets to describe deletion patterns when the length of the codeword is understood. For example [n] refers to the single element of D(n, n). Accordingly, let ⊆ be a partial order on deletion patterns corresponding to set inclusion, and let |τ| denote the number of bits deleted by τ. As such, we have τ ⊆ τ ′ implies |τ| ≤ |τ ′ |.
For a word w and τ ∈ D(|w|), let τ(w) and w \ τ both denote the result of applying τ to w. We use the second notation when we identify sets with deletion patterns, as in the above paragraph where the set elements correspond to the deleted positions.
In a concatenated code with outer code length n and inner code length L, we can identify a deletion pattern on the entire codeword τ ∈ D(nL) as the "concatenation" of n deletion patterns τ 1 ⌢ · · · ⌢ τ n , one for each inner codeword. To be precise, for all τ ∈ D(nL), there exists
and we denote this by τ = τ 1 ⌢ · · · ⌢ τ n . Using this notation, we refer to τ i as an inner code deletion pattern. Graphs. In a (directed or undirected) graph G, let V(G) and E(G) denote the vertex set and edge set of G respectively. For a subset W ⊆ V(G) of the vertices, let G ↾ W denote the subgraph induced by W. We use G ↾ W instead of the more standard G| W to avoid too many subscripts. For a vertex v ∈ V(G), let deg G (v) denote the degree of v in G when G is undirected, and let indeg G (v), outdeg G (v) denote the indegree and outdegree of v, respectively, in G when G is directed. We drop the subscript of G in deg, indeg and outdeg notations when the graph G is understood.
Concentration Bounds. We use the following forms of Chernoff bound.
Furthermore, if A 1 , . . . , A n are Bernoulli random variables, then
We also use the submartingale form of Azuma's Inequality.
Lemma 3.2 (Azuma). Let c be a constant. Let X
1 , X 2 , . . . be a submartingale such that |X i − X i−1 | ≤ c
for all i. Then for all positive reals t, we have
4 Deletion code decoding p-fraction of oblivious deletions
Overview of proof
In §2 we gave a high level overview. We now begin with a brief snapshot of the proof structure and how it is organized. We present our general code construction in §4.2. The construction uses the "clean construction" in [1] and an outer code that we choose randomly. We analyze properties of the concatenated construction in §4.3. We begin by extracting the useful behavior of deletion patterns with respect to our codewords. This deletion pattern analysis culminates in Lemma 4.7, allowing us to define the signature (Definition 4.8) of a deletion pattern. The key result of §4.3 is Proposition 4.18. It states that for any deletion pattern τ, the probability that two random candidate codewords c, c ′ are confusable (in the sense that τ(c) ⊑ c ′ ) is exponentially small in the code length. However, because working with deletion patterns directly is messy, the proposition is written in the language of matchings, a technical notion defined in Definition 4.11. In short, because the inner codewords are nicely behaved, we do not need to know the exact details of the behavior of a given deletion pattern τ, but rather only need certain properties of it, given by its signature. We thus define a matching to approximate the subsequence relation using only the signature of τ, so that "σ(X) is matchable in Y" (where σ is the outer code deletion pattern given by τ's signature) holds roughly when "τ(ψ(X)) ⊑ ψ(Y)" holds.
Combinatorially, Proposition 4.18 allows us to finish the proof. As stated in §2, for our outer code we consider [K] n minus a small set of easily disguised candidate codewords. The notion of a easily disguised candidate codeword is well defined by Lemma 4.23. For a sufficiently small constant γ, we randomly choose a size 2 γn outer code over the remaining outer codewords. In §4.4, we use the graph language described in §2 and prove Lemma 4.27, which roughly states that in a sparse directed graph, if we randomly sample a small subset of vertices, the induced subgraph is also sparse (for some appropriate definition of sparse) with high probability. Finally, in §4.5, we piece together these results, showing that Lemma 4.27 guarantees, with positive probability, that our random code combinatorially decodes against pN deletions in the average case.
Construction
Let p ∈ (0, 1), and let λ = λ(p) be the smallest integer such that (1 + p)/2 < 1 − 2 −λ . For our argument any λ such that p < 1 − 2 −λ suffices. In particular, for p < 1 2 , we can choose λ = 1, slightly simplifying the argument as described in §2. However, we choose λ to be the smallest λ such that (1 + p)/2 < 1 − 2 −λ to ensure a clean formula for the rate.
Let δ be such that p = 1 − 2 −λ − δ. Let n be a positive integer. With hindsight, choose
Note that R is even. For the remainder of this section, the variables p, λ, δ, K, R and L are fixed.
In this way we have 1
Consider the encoding ψ :
We construct a concatenated code where the outer code is a length n code over [K] and the inner code is {g 1 , g 2 , . . . , g K } ⊆ {0, 1} L . For the outer code, we choose a random code C out where each codeword is chosen uniformly at random from [K] n minus a small undesirable subset that we specify later. We choose our decoding function to be unique decoding. That is, our decoder iterates over all codewords c ∈ C and checks if the received word s is a subsequence of c. If it is a subsequence of exactly one c, the decoder returns that c, otherwise it fails. While this decoder is not optimal in terms of the fraction of correctly decoded codewords (it could try to break ties instead of just giving up), it is enough for this proof. Furthermore, since we are showing combinatorial decodability, we do not need the decoder to be efficient. If, for some p ′ > p, a code can decode p ′ nL average case or oblivious deletions, then it can decode pnL deletions. Thus, we can decrease δ until δn is an even integer, so may assume without loss of generality that δn is an even integer. 
Analyzing construction behavior
Note that g i has 2R K+1−i runs. In particular, the number of runs greatly varies between inner codewords. This property makes the concatenated construction powerful because it is difficult to find common subsequences of different inner codewords. The following definition allows us to reason about the inner codewords in terms of their run counts. Proof. Deleting any run reduces the number of runs in a word by at most 2, and τ reduces the number of runs by r − r ′ , so the claim follows.
The next lemma establishes the usefulness of widely varying runs in our construction. It says that even when an inner code deletion pattern has a large number of deletions, most of the inner codewords still look the same in terms of the number of runs. The intuition for the lemma is as follows. Consider the extreme example of an inner code deletion pattern σ that "completely corrupts" the inner codewords g 1 , . . . , g λ . That is, σ deletes all the zeros of each of g 1 , . . . , g λ . Since σ deletes all the zeros of g λ , it must delete every other run of R λ−1 bits, thus deleting L/2 bits. Applying these deletions alone to g λ−1 leaves it with half as many runs of length exactly R λ−2 . However, since σ also deletes all zeros of g λ−1 , it must delete every other run of R λ−2 bits of the remaining L/2 bits, thus deleting L/4 more bits. Similarly, since σ deletes all zeros of g λ−2 , it must delete an additional L/8 bits. Continuing this logic, we have σ must delete L(1 − 2 −λ ) bits total. This tells us that if an inner code deletion pattern completely corrupts the inner codewords g 1 , . . . , g λ , it needs L(1 − 2 −λ ) deletions. This logic works even if we chose to corrupt any subset of λ inner codewords other than {g 1 , . . . , g λ }. One can imagine that corrupting (according to Definition 4.2) inner codewords is almost as hard as completely corrupting them, so adding some slack gives the lemma.
Lemma 4.4. If σ is an inner code deletion pattern with
Proof. Suppose λ is a positive integer such that σ corrupts g i for λ different values of i,
Recall that a g i segment is an interval of the form
. Inductively define the collections of intervals I 1 , . . . , I λ and the sets of indices I 1 , . . . , I λ as follows. For 1 ≤ a ≤ λ, set
Intuitively, I 1 as the set of runs in g i 1 that are entirely deleted by σ, and I 1 is the set of those deleted indices. Then, I 2 is the set of runs of g i 2 deleted by σ but not already accounted for by I 1 , and I 2 is the set of bits in the runs of I 2 . We can interpret I 3 , . . . , I λ and I 3 , . . . , I λ similarly. By construction, I 1 , . . . , I λ are disjoint, and their union is a subset of σ (thought of as a subset of [L]), so
Note that for any j < j ′ , every g j ′ -segment is the disjoint union of R j ′ − j many g j -segments. We thus have [L] is the disjoint union of g i a -segments and I b is also the disjoint union of g i a -segments when b < a (and thus 
By construction, the only g i a -segments that are deleted by σ are the intervals covered by I 1 ∪ · · · ∪ I a . Since σ corrupts g i a , we know σ(g i a ) has less than L/(R i a −1 √ R) runs. By Lemma 4.3, we have
Simplifying and using
From here it is easy to verify by induction that, for all 1 ≤ a ≤ λ, we have
Indeed, (15) for a = 1 provides the base case, and if we know (16) for some a − 1, then by (15) we have
completing the induction. The induction proves (12) , from which we have
as desired. If, for some ℓ, σ is ℓ-admissible, then Lemma 4.4 tells us σ corrupts at most ℓ different g i . However, note that ℓ-admissibility is stronger that corrupting at most ℓ different g i as ℓ-admissibility gives a stronger upper bound on the number of deletions in σ, which is necessary in Lemma 4.12. 
Proof. By a simple counting argument, we have |τ
values of i. For the remaining at least δn values of i, we have τ i is (λ − 1)-admissible.
The following corollary allows us to reduce our analysis of a deletion pattern τ to analyzing positions where τ's inner code deletion pattern is (λ − 1)-admissible. We effectively assume that our deletion pattern completely deletes all inner codewords with a non-admissible index. Proof. Let τ = τ 1 ⌢ · · · ⌢ τ n . By Lemma 4.6, there exist δn indices ℓ 1 < · · · < ℓ δn such that, for
is simply the result of deleting the remaining bits in inner codewords of non-admissible indices in τ • ψ(X). By construction, each τ ℓ i ∈ D(L) is (λ − 1)-admissible, so we can choose S 1 , . . . , S δn by setting S ℓ to be the set that τ ℓ i corrupts. Note that some S i may have size less than λ − 1, but we can arbitrarily add elements of [K] to S i until it has λ − 1 elements. This is okay as item 3 in the corollary statement remains true if we add elements to S i .
In our analysis, for a deletion pattern τ = τ 1 ⌢ · · · ⌢ τ n , we only care about the behavior of a given inner code deletion pattern τ i as far as the set S i of inner codewords g j that it corrupts; instead of considering all possible deletion patterns τ ∈ D(nL), it suffices to only consider all possible σ, S 1 , . . . , S δn . This motivates the following definition. Below we define the matchability relation ≺. Definition 4.11 allows us to worry only about the signature of a deletion pattern τ rather than τ itself. Intuitively, we can think of the matchability relation ≺ as an approximation of the subsequence relation ⊑. Proposition 4.12 establishes this relationship formally. Specifically, it states that if τ is a deletion pattern with signature (σ, S 1 , . . . , S δn ), then for X, Y ∈ [K] n , we have σ(X) ⊑ Y implies that σ(X) has a matching in Y with appropriate parameters. This means that if we want to show there are few incorrectly decoded codewords in a given code, it suffices to show that few codewords have an appropriately parameterized matching in some other codeword.
We first define type-A and type-B pairs of indices (i, j) ∈ {1, . . . , |X|} × {1, . . . , |Y|}. Intuitively, pairs (i, j) are type-B only if τ i (ψ(X i )) has many more runs than ψ(Y j ), i.e. it is difficult to find (continguous) subwords of τ i (ψ(X i )) as subsequences of ψ(Y j ). with a pair (a, b) = (1, 1) . The first and second coordinates correspond to indices of the strings X and Y, respectively. Define an A-move to be incrementing the first coordinate, a, by 1, and a B-move to be incrementing of the second coordinate, b, by 1. Note that at the end of this algorithm, exactly one of a = |X| and b = |Y| is true. We say this matching is a success if we ended with a = |X|, otherwise it is a failure. 
Run the matching algorithm defined above to obtain a matching of X and Y. Let M be the set of all (a, b) reached by some step of the algorithm. We wish to show this matching is a success, i.e. that there exists some b such that (|X|, b) ∈ M, or, equivalently, there does not exist a such that (a, |Y|) ∈ M.
Since τ(ψ(X)) ⊑ ψ(Y), we can find τ(ψ(X)) as a subsequence of ψ(Y) by greedily matching the bits of τ(ψ(X)) with the bits of ψ(Y). Let N be the set of (i, k) such that some bit of τ i (ψ(X i )) is matched with some bit in ψ(Y k ). We first establish some basic facts about M, N. 
4. For all i * ∈ {1, . . . , |X|}, k * ∈ {1, . . . , |Y|}, we have {k : (i * , k) ∈ N} and {i : (i, k * ) ∈ N} are intervals of consecutive integers. 
Let ≤ M be a relation on
we never have both a < a ′ and b ′ < b.
we never have both i < i ′ and k ′ < k.
For a ∈ {1, . . . , |X|} and b ∈ {1, . . . , |Y|}, define
See Figure 1 for illustrations of the behavior of these eight functions. We first establish a few facts about the notation α 0 , β 0 , . . . that are helpful for developing intuition and are also useful later. These proofs are more involved than Fact 4.13 and are provided.
Lemma 4.14. 
For all a
∈ {1, . . . , |X|}, if κ f (a) − κ 0 (a) < √ R, then there exists b ′ ∈ [κ 0 (a), κ f (a)] such that (a, b ′ ) is type-A. 2. For all a ∈ {1, . . . , |X|} we have β f (a) − β 0 (a) ≤ √ R and for all β 0 (a) ≤ b ′ < β f (a) we have (a, b ′ ) is type-B Furthermore, if β f (a) − β 0 (a) < √ R, then (a, β f (a)) is type-A. 3. For all b ∈ {1, . . . , |Y|}, we have ι f (b) − ι 0 (b) ≤ 2 λ . 4. For all b ∈ {1, . . . , |Y|}, we have (i ′ , b) is type-A for all i ′ ∈ [ι 0 (b) + 1, ι f (b) − 1].
For all b
As κ f (a) − κ 0 (a) < √ R this means the right side of (22) has less than √ R · 2R K−X a = 2R K+ 1 2 −X a runs while the left side has at least that many runs, a contradiction.
For part 3, suppose for contradiction that
as a strict subsequence (ψ(Y b ) additionally contains at least one bit from each of τ ι 0 (ψ(X ι 0 )) and τ ι f (ψ(X ι f ))), we have 
Definition 4.15.
We say an index in a ∈ {1, . . . , |X|} is X-proper if
and we say an index b ∈ {1, . . . , |Y|} is Y-proper if 
Step 4
Proof.
Step 1. First, note that, as (1, 1) ∈ M, N, we have α 0 (1) = β 0 (1) = ι 0 (1) = κ 0 (1) = 1.
Step 2. Next, we show that for all a, if β 0 (a) ≤ κ 0 (a) then a is X-proper. That is, we show β f (a) ≤ κ f (a). Suppose for contradiction we have κ f (a) < β f (a) so that β 0 (a) ≤ κ 0 (a) ≤ κ f (a) < β f (a) (see Figure 2) . By Lemma 4.14 part 2, we have
As κ f (a)−κ 0 (a) < β f (a)−β 0 (a), we have κ f (a)−κ 0 (a) < √ R, so we can apply Lemma 4.14 part 1 to obtain that (a, b ′ ) is type-A for some b ′ ∈ [κ 0 (a), κ f (a)]. This is a contradiction as all such b ′ must be type-B.
Step 3. Next, we show that for all b, Figure 3a) . We have α f − α 0 < ι f − ι 0 ≤ 2 λ by Lemma 4.14 part 3. Thus, by Lemma 4.14 part 5, (α f (b), b) is type-B. By Lemma 4.14 part 4,
On the other hand, β f (α 0 (b)) ≤ κ f (α 0 (b)) by assumption that α 0 (b) is X-proper, which is a contradiction. This covers all possible cases, completing Step 3.
Step 4. We prove that, for all b ∈ {1, . . Step 5. By the same argument as Step 4, we have that, for all a ∈ {1, . . . , |X|}, if β 0 (a) is Y-proper, then a is X-proper.
Step 6. We prove by strong induction that for pairs (a, b), ordered by < M , we have a is X-proper and b is Y-proper. Combining Steps 1,2, and 3, we have
where the first and third inequalities are actually equalities arising from Step 1, the second inequality is established by Step 2, and the fourth is established by Step 3. Thus, 1 is both X-proper and Y-proper. Now suppose we have some pair (a, b) ∈ M with (1, 1) < M (a, b) and (22) 
Proof. Let s = 2 λ . With hindsight, let β = log K
16R . It suffices to prove
This suffices because for any σ, the distribution of 
It thus suffices to prove
Pr B ⌊δn/s⌋−1 < |Y| < 2 −βn .
The key idea of this proof is that the B i 's grow much faster than the A i 's, so that the B i 's "run out of indices in Y" faster than the A i 's "run out of indices in X", even though Y is longer than X. In particular, by definition of a matching, we have A i+1 − A i ≤ s = 2 λ , but, on the other hand, we show that B i+1 − B i is, in expectation, Ω(log K) (see Figure 5) .
We have two technical lemmas. The proofs are straightforward, and we include them in Appendix C for completness. 
Lemma 4.19. Let J be chosen uniformly from [K]. Let D be a random variable that is 1 if J
Proof. It suffices to prove that if we additionally condition on A i+1 − A i < s, then the expectation is at least (log K)/4, and that the same is true if we condition on 
Continuing the proof of Proposition 4.18, let α = 1 4 log K so that 
Combining with (35) gives
We conclude
As exp(−
, we have (29) is true, completing the proof of Proposition 4.18.
To conclude this section, we formalize the intuition that the "worst possible deletion pattern", that is, the deletion pattern that makes decoding most difficult in some sense, is the deletion pattern such that each (λ − 1)-admissible inner deletion pattern corrupts g 1 , . . . , g λ−1 . This fact is intuitive, as it is hard, for example, to find g 1 as a subsequence of a random ψ(Y) because g 1 has many runs. Thus if our deletion pattern τ corrupts the inner codewords with the most runs, there is a greater probability that over random X, Y we have τ(ψ(X)) is a subsequence of ψ(Y). However, note that, to make a clean assertion, we continue to argue using the matching relation rather than subsequence relation. 
Proof. We start with a claim. 
Since each of h 1 , . . . , h δn are bijections, h is a bijection as well.
Let X be such that X ≺ (2 λ ,
We know M is a successful matching, and we wish to show M ′ is a successful matching.
If (a, b) is type-A with respect to X, Y, S 1 , . . . ,
. Let ℓ ≥ 0 be an integer and let (a, b) ∈ M and (a ′ , b ′ ) ∈ M ′ be the state of the matchings after the ℓth step of the matchings of X in Y and h(X) in Y, respectively. It is easy to see by induction that a ≤ a ′ and b ′ ≤ b; if a < a ′ then after one move we still have a ≤ a ′ , and if a = a ′ and Ms next move is an A-move, then M ′ s next move must also be an A-move. Since M succeeds, we have (|X|, b) ∈ M for some b < |Y|, so we conclude that (|X|, b ′ ) ∈ M ′ for some b ′ ≤ b < |Y|. Thus M ′ succeeds as well.
Since h is a bijection such that
we have
as desired.
Technical combinatorial lemmas
Lemma 4.25. Let n be a positive integer and suppose we have 0 < β < 1. Suppose that γ = β/3, M = 2 γn , and
is chosen as a random subset of V(G) by including each vertex of V(G) in C out with probability M/N. Then for sufficiently large n, we have
Remark 4.26. Essentially this lemma is saying that when the edge density is extremely small, around 2 −βn , then for all but an extremely small set of choices for C out , C out is extremely sparse.
Proof. Let E = E(G).
We know E satisfies |E| ≤ dN/2 < N 2 r. Enumerate the edges 1, . . . , |E| arbitrarily. Let Y 1 , . . . , Y |E| be Bernoulli random variables denoting whether the ith edge is in C out . Let Z = Y 1 + · · · + Y |E| . We would like to show
We do this by computing a sufficiently large moment of Z and using
For a tuple of (not necessarily distinct) edges (e 1 , . . . , e k ), denote V(e 1 , . . . , e k ) to be the set of vertices on at least one of the edges e 1 , . . . , e k . Alternatively, we say V(e 1 , . . . , e k ) is the set of vertices covered by edges e 1 , . . . , e k . Note that for all e 1 , . . . , e k , we have 2 ≤ V(e 1 , . . . , e k ) ≤ 2k. Let P k,ℓ = #{(e 1 , . . . , e k ) : |V(e 1 , . . . , e k )| = ℓ} denote the number of ordered tuples of edges from E that cover exactly ℓ vertices.
Proof. We bound P k,ℓ by first bounding the number of sets (unordered tuples) of edges covering exactly ℓ vertices and then multiply by k!. We first compute the number of ways to construct a forest of trees covering ℓ vertices using only edges from E. We do this by casework on the number of connected components. Let 1 ≤ c ≤ ⌊ℓ/2⌋ be an integer. To construct a forest with c connected components, we first choose c disjoint edges e 1 , . . . , e c . This can be done in at most |E| c ways. We have |V(e 1 , . . . The i = ℓ − c th edge completes a forest covering ℓ vertices. Recalling that |E| < N 2 r and d = Nr, we have that the total number of ways to construct a forest in this fashion is at most
We have used ℓ − c edges thus far. There are k − ℓ + c remaining edges. As |V(e 1 , . . . , e k )| = ℓ, these remaining edges must connect one of the ℓ 2 pairs of vertices in V(e 1 , . . . , e k−ℓ+c ). As c ≤ ⌊ℓ/2⌋ < ℓ, we have k − ℓ + c < k. The remaining edges can thus be chosen in at most ℓ 2 k−ℓ+c < ℓ 2k ways. Using (46) and multiplying by k! we have
Note that M √ r ≪ 1. With this claim, we have
Finally, choosing k = log n, we have
as desired. 
Proof. As, by assumption, Y has outdegree at most N · r for all Y ∈ V(G), the average indegree of G is at most N · r. Thus at most ǫ/8 fraction of all words in V(G) have indegree larger than 8 ǫ · N · r. Call this set of vertices W. We have
Since |C out ∩ W| is the sum of i.i.d Bernoulli random variables, we have by Lemma 3.1 
Proof of Construction (Theorem 2.2)
Proof of Theorem 2.2. We would like to show there exists a code C and an ǫ = o N (1) such that, for any deletion pattern τ deleting pN bits, #{x ∈ C : ∃y ∈ C s. t. x y and τ(x) ≤ y} ≤ ǫ|C|.
(56)
Let σ ∈ D(n, (1 − δ)n) be a deletion pattern for our outer code 
In the graph language, this means every
. We remove all Y with large f (Y). Let β = log K/16R. By Proposition 4.18, we know the average value of f (Y) is 2 −βn . Hence at most K n /2 such Y satisfy f (Y) ≥ 2 · 2 −βn . These are the easily disguised candidate codewords mentioned in §2. There is thus a set
By construction, for all σ, S 1 , . . . , S δn , the outdegree of every vertex of G σ,S 1 ,...,S δn is at most (K n /2) · r for some r = 2 −(β−o(1))n .
Let γ = β/4. Let M = 2 γn and ǫ = 2 −γn/2 . Choose a subset C out ⊆ W by including each vertex of W in C out independently with probability M/|W| so that E[|C out |] = M.
By Lemma 4.27 for N = K n /2, β, γ, M, ǫ, r, and G σ,S 1 ,...,S δn , we have that, for all σ and sufficiently large n, Pr
This is equivalently
Union bounding over the at-most-2 n possible values of σ and
Additionally, with probability approaching 1, |C out | ≥ 
-admissible and preserves all g j for all j not in some size-λ − 1 set S i , and furthermore we have τ ′ (ψ(σ(X))) ⊑ τ(ψ(X)) for all X ∈ [K] n . By choice of C out , for at least (1 − ǫ)|C out | choices of X ∈ C out , σ(X) is not (2 λ , √ R, S 1 , . . . , S δn ) matchable in all Y ∈ C out . Thus, for these X, we have τ ′ (ψ(σ(X))) ψ(Y) for all Y ∈ C out by Lemma 4.12. Since τ ′ (ψ(σ(X))) ⊑ τ(ψ(X)) for all X ∈ [K] n , we have for these (1 − ǫ)|C out | choices of X that τ(ψ(X)) ψ(Y) for all Y ∈ C out . Thus, choosing C = ψ(C out ) gives our desired average deletion code.
Recall λ is the smallest integer such that (1 + p)/2 < 1 − 2 −λ and δ = 1 − 2 −λ − p so that 2 λ = Θ(1/(1 − p)) and δ = Θ(1 − p). Recall K = 2 ⌈2 λ+5 /δ⌉ and R = 4K 4 so that K = 2 Θ (1/(1−p) 2 ) . The rate of the outer code is log 2 γn /n log K and the rate of the inner code is log K/L. The total rate is thus
This completes the proof of Theorem 2.2.
5 Efficiently decodable codes for random deletions with p approaching 1
Construction
We present a family of constant rate codes that decodes with high probability in a binary deletion channel with deletion fraction p (BDC p ). These codes have rate c 0 (1− p) for a constant c 0 , which is within a constant of the upper bound (1 − p), which even holds for the erasure channel. By Drinea and Mitzenmacher [9] the maximum known rate of a non-efficiently correctable binary deletion channel code is (1 − p)/9. The construction is based on the intuition that deterministic codes are better than random codes for the deletion channel. Indeed, for adversarial deletions, random codes correct 0.17 deletions [17] , while explicitly constructed codes correct 1 3 and √ 2 − 1 deletions [1] . We begin by borrowing a result from [14] . Now we follow the approach of [14] and [12] . The code.
• Outer code The outer code C out is a Reed Solomon code of length n over F q h (where n = q) correcting ǫ = 1 1000 fraction of errors/erasures. Unlike normal Reed Solomon codes that only store the field symbol, we encode both the symbol and the index as a pair (i, c i ) in the inner code. Our inner code thus has nq h codewords. For sake of having nice numbers, we take h = 1 so that there are nq = n 2 codewords. As a remark, we can improve the rate by a factor of 2 by taking larger values of h, at a cost of the decoding time.
• Inner code The inner code C in : n × F q → {0, 1} m is given by Lemma 5.3 having rate 0.23 and correcting 0.06 fraction of insertions and deletions. Each codeword has runs of length 1 and 2 only, and each codeword starts and ends with a 1. This code is constructed via brute force and has length m = 5 log n (in general 5 2 (h + 1) log n).
• Buffer We insert a buffer of ǫm 0s between pairs of inner codewords.
• Duplication After concatenating the codes and inserting the buffers, we replace each character c (including characters in the buffers) with ⌈B/(1 − p)⌉ (B = 40) copies of c to obtain our final code C Rate. The rate of the outer code is h h+1 (1 − 2ǫ), the rate of the inner code is 0.23, the buffer and duplications multiply the rate by Decoding algorithm.
• First identify all runs of 0s in the received word with length at least Bǫm/2. These are our the decoding buffers that divide the word into decoding windows.
• Divide each decoding window into runs. For each run, if it has more than 1.4B bits, decode it as two copies of that bit, otherwise decode it as one copy. For example, 0 2B gets decoded as 00 while 0 B gets decoded as 0. For each decoding window, concatenate these decoded bits in their original order, and decode a pair (i, c i ) from each decoding window using C in .
• Use the polynomial reconstruction Welch Berlekamp algorithm to find a degree-at-most-(1 − 2ǫ)n polynomial passing through at least (1 − ǫ)n pairs (i, c i ).
Runtime. The inner code is constructible in time O(2 m ) = O(n 5 ), and constructing the outer Reed Solomon code, adding the buffers, and applying duplications can be done in linear time. The overall construction time is thus O(n 5 ).
A naive implementation of the Welch Berlekamp algorithm takes O(n 3 ) time (there are faster algorithms which run in near-linear time but this step is not the bottleneck for the overall algorithm). The decoding with C in can be done in timeÕ(n 3 ) by brute force search over the n 2 possible codewords. Checking each of the n 2 codewords takes time O(m 2 ) because we are computing longest common subsequence, giving a total time of O(n 2 m 2 ) =Õ(n 2 ) for each inner codeword. We need to run this inner decoding n times, so the total time isÕ(n 3 ). The decoding thus takes timeÕ(n 3 ). Note if we take larger values of h the decoding time becomesÕ(n h+2 ).
Correctness. We claim that each inner codeword is decoded correctly with probability at least 1−n −Ω(1) . To do this, we show that each of the following occurs with probability at most n −Ω(1) .
1. Some inner codeword is decoded incorrectly.
A spurious decoding buffer is created.
3. A decoding buffer is deleted.
For 1, suppose an inner codeword r = r 1 . . . r k ∈ C in has k runs r i each of size 1 or 2, so that m/2 ≤ k ≤ m, suppose our received word after duplicating r and passing through the deletion channel is s, and suppose that applying the decoding algorithm to s produces a codeword r ′ .
Definition 5.4.
A run of α identical bits in the received word s is
Note that a run in s can have more than 2B/(1 − p) bits if it is merged with neighboring runs of the same bit.
By abuse of notation, we say that a length 1 or 2 run r i of an inner codeword has type-t i if, after duplication and sending through the deletion channel, the resulting string is type-t i .
By definition, type-1 runs are decoded as single bits, and type-2 runs are decoded as a pair of identical bits.
Let t 1 , . . . , t k be the types of the runs r 1 , . . . , r k , respectively. The probability that a run r i of length 1 is type-2 is the probability that a string of length B/(1 − p) has at least 1.4B bits after passing through the deletion channel, BDC p . By Chernoff bounds in Lemma 3.1, this is at most (using the multiplicative form with δ = 0.4 and
Similarly, the probability that a run of length-2 is type-1 is at most
The probability any run is type-0 is at most p B/(1−p) ≤ 1 e B < 1/2 40 . We now have established that runs in r keep their length with probability at least 0.941 after the three steps of duplication, deletion, and decoding. If the only kinds of errors in the runs of r were runs of length 1 becoming runs of length 2 and runs of length 2 become runs of length 1, then we have that, with high probability, the number of insertions deletions needed to transform r ′ back into r is at most 0.06|r| by concentration bounds. However, we must also account for the fact that some runs of r may become deleted completely after passing through the deletion channel, in which case the two neighboring runs become merged together. For example, if a run of 1s was deleted completely after duplication and deletion, its neighboring runs of 0s would be interpreted by the decoder as a single run. Fortunately, as we saw, the probability that a run is type-0 is extremely small (< 10 −12 ), and each type-0 run only locally increases the number of insertions and deletions in r ′ by at most a constant number. We show this constant is at most 8, and while we could improve the constant, this would have a negligible effect on our analysis: the probability of having a type-0 run is so small that the constant does not substantially affect the expected number of insertions and deletions between r and r ′ , which we ultimately would like to bound away from 0.06|r|.
Let Y i be a random variable that is 0 if |r i | = t i , 1 if {|r i |, t i } = {1, 2}, and 8 if t i = 0. We claim k i=1 Y i is an upper bound on the number of insertions and deletions need to manipulate r into r ′ . To see this, first note that if t i 0 for all i, then the number of runs of r and r ′ are equal, so we can transform r into r ′ by adding a bit to each length-1 type-2 run of r and deleting a bit from each length-2 type-1 run of r ′ . Now if some number ℓ of the t i are 0, then at most 2ℓ of the runs in r become merged with some other run after duplication and deletion. Each run of r that is merged effectively gets deleted and each set of merged runs gets replaced with 1 or 2 copies of the corresponding bit. For example, if r 1 = 11, r 2 = 0, r 3 = 11, r 1 and r 3 are both type-2 where, after duplication and deletion, 2B bits remain in each, and r 2 is type-0, then our received word is 1 4B which gets decoded as 11 because it is type-2. To account for the type-0 runs in transforming r into r ′ , we delete at most two bits from r for each type-0 run, we delete at most two bits for each of at most 2ℓ merged runs in r, and we insert back at most two bits for each run in the received word s resulting from a merge. The total number of additional insertions and deletions required to account for type-0 runs of r is thus at most 8ℓ, so we need at most 8 insertions and deletions to account for each type-0 run.
Note that if r i has length 1, then by (64) we have
Similarly, if r i has length 2, then by (65) we have
Thus E[Y i ] < 0.059 for all i. The Y i are independent so the Chernoff bound gives
A spurious buffer appears inside an inner codeword if many consecutive runs of 1s are type-0. To be precise, a set of ℓ consecutive type-0 runs of 1s occurs with probability at most 2 −40ℓ . Thus the probability an inner codeword has a sequence of ǫm/5 consecutive type-0 runs of 1s is at most m 2 · 2 −40ǫm/5 = n −Ω(1) . Now assume that in an inner codeword, each set of consecutive type-0 runs of 1s has size at most ǫm/5. Each set of ℓ consecutive type-0 runs of 1s merges ℓ + 1 consecutive runs of 0s in r, so that they appear as a single longer run in s. The sum of the length of these ℓ + 1 runs is at most 2ℓ + 2, so after duplication these runs have total length at most B(2ℓ + 2)/(1 − p) < 2.1Bǫm/5(1 − p). Thus the length of their merged run in s is the sum of at most 2.1Bǫm/5(1 − p) i.i.d random variables with mean 1 − p, so the probability the sum is at least Bǫm/2 is at most 2 −O(ǫm) = n −Ω (1) . Hence, conditioned on each set of consecutive type-0 runs of 1s having size at most ǫm/5, the probability of having no spurious buffers is at least 1 − n −Ω (1) . Thus the overall probability there are no spurious buffers in the inner codeword is at least (
Since each inner codeword contains at most m spurious buffers, the expected number of spurious buffers is m · n −Ω(1) = n −Ω (1) . A deleted buffer occurs only when the sum of Bǫm/(1 − p) i.i.d Bernoulli random variables with mean 1 − p sum to less than Bǫm/2, which by Chernoff bounds happens with probability 2 −Ω(m) = n −Ω(1) .
Each spurious buffer, deleted buffer, and incorrectly decoded inner codeword increases the number of errors and or erasures by at most O (1) . The expected number of incorrect inner codewords plus spurious buffers plus deleted buffers is therefore n 1−Ω(1) , so the probability that this is at least δn is at most n −Ω(1) by Markov's inequality, so the RS decoding succeeds with probability 1 − n −Ω(1) as desired. We believe that, with a more careful analysis, the decoding failure probability can be made 2 −Ω(n) . This concludes the proof of Theorem 1.2.
Possible Alternative Constructions
In a binary deletion channel with deletion probability p (BDC p ), each bit is deleted independently with probability p. Drinea and Mitzenmacher [9, 10] proved that the capacity of the BDC p is at least (1 − p)/9. However, their proof is nonconstructive and they do not provide an efficient decoding algorithm.
One might think it is possible to use Drinea and Mitzenmacher's construction as a black box. We could follow the approach in §5.1, [14] and [12] by concatenating a rate (1 − p)/9 random-deletion-correcting binary code with an outer Reed Solomon code, so that the outer code has length n and the inner code has length m = O(log n). We can try to prevent synchronization errors in the same way by (1) encoding a Reed Solomon codeword with both its position and symbol (i, c i ) ∈ [n] × F n and (2) inserting buffers of 0s of length ǫm in between inner codewords. Even though Drinea and Mitzenmacher's so-called jigsaw decoding does not run efficiently, it is not hard to show (Lemma 5.5) that a jigsaw-decodable code, after possibly throwing out a small fraction of codewords, is maximum-likelihood decodable.
For maximum likelihood decoding on the inner code, we only need to compare the received string s with every codeword c to determine the probability s was received given c and choose the c with highest probability. Each comparison can be done in polylog n time by dynamic programming, and there are 2 O(log n) = poly(n) inner codewords, so maximum likelihood decoding on the inner code runs efficiently. Then, as the inner code decodes (1 − p)/9 random deletions with high probability, the outer code has exponentially small numbers of errors, so the Reed-Solomon code decodes correctly.
Lemma 5.5. Suppose a code C is decodable under random deletions with probability p using some kind of decoder, not necessary the maximum likelihood decoder. That is, for each codeword c ∈ C, after sending through the random deletion channel, the decoder returns c with probability 1 − o (1) . Then, if we replace the decoder with the maximum likelihood decoder, we can find a code C ′ such that |C ′ | ≥ |C|/2 such that each codeword c ∈ C ′ is decoded corrected with probability 1 − o(1).
However, this approach runs into several issues 1. First, the inner code is still nonconstructive, and constructing the inner code by brute force takes 2 2 O(log n) = 2 poly n time. Thus, for this idea to work, one needs multiple layers of concatenation, which would be nontrivial to analyze.
2. Second, while the inner code can tolerate random deletions with probability p, bits are not deleted in the concatenated construction according to a BDC p ; the 0 bits closer to the buffers between the inner codewords are deleted with higher probability because they might be "merged" with a buffer. For example, if an inner codeword is 101111, then because the codeword is surrounded by buffers of 0s, deleting the leftmost 1 morally deletes two bits because the 0 is interpreted as part of the buffer. While this may not be a significant issue because the distributions of deletions in this deletion process and BDC p are quite similar, much more care would be needed to prove correctness.
Conclusion

Decoding deletions vs. insertions and deletions
A lemma due to Levenshtein [22] states that a code C can decode against pn adversarial deletions if and only if it can decode against pn adversarial insertions and deletions. In oblivious and random error models, decoding insertions vs insertions and deletions are not the same. In decoding against oblivious deletions, we not only need to worry about whether two codewords are by insertions and deletions, but also the number of ways in which they are confusable. In particular, it is okay (and necessary when the error fraction is greater than 1 2 ) in the oblivious model for two codewords c and c ′ to be confusable, but we need the number of deletion patterns τ that confuse them, i.e. with τ(c) ⊑ c ′ or τ(c ′ ) ⊑ c, to be small. It may be possible to make an assertion that if the number of ways c and c ′ are confusable by deletion patterns is small, then the number of ways they are confusable by insertion and deletion patterns is also small. This would show that our oblivious deletion code could also decode against oblivious insertions and deletions.
For the random model, it is not even clear how to define random insertions. One could define insertions and deletions via the Poisson repeat channel where each bit is replaced with a Poisson many copies of itself (see [9, 25] ). Alternatively one can consider a model of random insertions and deletions where, for every bit, the bit is deleted with a fixed probability p 1 , a bit is inserted after it with a fixed probability p 2 , or it is transmitted unmodified with probability 1 − p 1 − p 2 [27] . One could also investigate settings involving memoryless insertions, deletions, and substitutions [24] .
It may be possible to extend our oblivious and random deletion construction to oblivious and random insertion and deletions by tweaking the parameters. This was the case for bridging the gap between efficiently decoding adversarial deletions [14] and efficiently decoding adversarial insertions and deletions [12] . Our analysis for deletions analyzes runs of 0s and 1s, but perhaps it would be possible to analyze insertions and deletions by relaxing the definition of a run to be "a subword with 0.9 density of 0s and 1s." For now, however, we leave the case of correcting oblivious insertions and deletions approaching 1 as an open problem.
Open problems
These are a number of open questions concerning deletion codes. Our work brings to the fore a few more.
1. Can we close the gap between √ 2 − 1 and 1 2 for adversarial deletions?
2. We showed the existence of codes that decode against oblivious and average case deletions. Can we modify the proof to show existence of codes decoding against oblivious and average case insertions and deletions?
3. Can we adapt the construction for oblivious and average case deletions to obtain explicit codes that are constructable, encodable, and decodable in polynomial time?
4. For erasures, the capacity of the random error channel and the capacity of the oblivious error channel are both 1 − p. For bit flips the random and oblivious error channels also have the same capacity at 1 − h(p). Can we construct codes that decode oblivious deletions with capacity equal to the capacity of the random deletion channel? On the other end, could we upper bound the capacity by o(1 − p) as p → 1? Such an upper bound would fundamentally distinguish the behavior of the deletions from errors and erasures.
5. Can we find efficiently decodable codes for random deletions with better rate, perhaps reaching or beating the best known existential capacity lower bound of (1 − p)/9?
6. Can find codes correcting p fraction of online deletions when p approaches 1 2 ? (see §1.2 for discussion)
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In plain English, this lemma says that for a fixed message and deletion pattern, the probability that message decodes incorrectly too many times (> ǫ fraction of the time) is too large (> 2 −h(p)n ). In short, the reason the lemma is true is because the probability the entire code C contains a "really bad" word (e.g. a word with at least 0.91n runs of 1s) is too large. The following remark shows us, using Lemma B.2, why we cannot follow the same randomized approach as Theorem B.1. 
Unfortunately the last inequality (indicated in red) is false by Lemma B.2.
Proof. It suffices to prove for p = 0.4. Indeed, as p increases,
increases as τ(c) contains fewer symbols. If p = 0.4, then τ(c) has 0.6n characters. Note that if c is uniform on {0, 1} n , then τ(c) is uniform on {0, 1} 0.6n . It is easy to check that for a uniformly chosen 0.6n string, the probability it is a subsequence of the length 0.91n string a 0.91n = 0101 . . . 01 is 1 − 2 −Ω(n) : the position in the longest string increases by 1.5 each time, so in expectation the string spans 0.9n characters of a 0.91n , so it is not a subsequence with exponentially small probability by Chernoff bounds.
There are 2 0.09n length n strings that start with a 0.91n . Call this set of strings A. Thus, the probability that C contains an element of A is at least 2 −0.91n since that is the probability the first element is an element of A. Conditioned on C containing an element of A, the probability that, for some c ∈ E(m), τ(c) is a subsequence of some element of A is at least the probability that c is a subsequence of a 0.91n , which is 1 − 2 −Ω(n) . Thus, conditioned on C containing an element of A, we have
Conditioned on C being fixed, consider the indicator random variables X i for whether each c i ∈ E(m) satisfies τ(c i ) is a subsequence of some c ′ ∈ C \ E(m). The X 1 , . . . , X t are i.i.d, so the probability X i /t > ǫ is approximately 1, (for sure, it is 1 − 2 −Ω(n) ). Thus we conclude Intuitively B.2 should be true as deletion codes behave poorly when chosen completely randomly. In the adversarial deletion channel, random codes correct only 0.17n deletions [17] , while the best known constructions correct 0.41n deletions [1] .
D Proof of Lemma 5.5
Suppose C has block length n and that each codeword decodes correctly with probability 1 − ǫ using the some initial decoder. Let X c be the indicator random variable that c decodes correctly under the initial decoder, and Y c be the random variable that c decodes correctly under maximum likelihood. Take the remaining at least |C|/2 codewords to form a new code C ′ . Note having less codewords only increases the probability any codeword is decoded correctly. Under the maximum likelihood decoder, each of these codewords decodes correctly with probability at least 1 − 2ǫ, as desired.
